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The revenge of the places that don’t matter  
(and what to do about it) 
 
Abstract: Persistent poverty, economic decay, and lack of opportunities are at the root of 
considerable discontent in declining and lagging-behind areas the world over. Poor 
development prospects and an increasing belief that these places have ‘no future’ – as 
economic dynamism has been posited to be increasingly dependent on agglomeration 
economies – have led many of these so-called ‘places that don’t matter’ to revolt against the 
status quo. The revolt has come via an unexpected source: the ballot-box in a wave of 
political populism with strong territorial, rather than social foundations. I will argue that the 
populist wave is challenging the sources of existing well-being in both the less-dynamic and 
the more prosperous areas and that better, rather than more, place-sensitive territorial 
development policies are needed in order to find a solution to the problem. Place-sensitive 
development policies need, however, to stay clear of the welfare, income-support, and big 
investment projects of past development strategies if they are to be successful and focus on 
tapping into untapped potential and on providing opportunities to those people living in the 
places that ‘don’t matter’. 
Keywords: Economic development, territorial inequality, regions, cities, populism, place-
sensitive policies. 
JEL Classification: F63, O18, R11, R12. 
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From hectoring to revenge 
On October 16, 2008, Tim Leunig, then a Lecturer in Economic History at the London 
School of Economics, stood in Liverpool’s Cathedral in front of a crowd of somewhat 
bemused and worried Liverpudlians to essentially deliver the message that Liverpool’s time 
was past; that the place that they lived in and loved no longer mattered. Cities and counties in 
the North of England had “slipped back relative to both the national average and Britain's 
most successful towns” and “regeneration policy [had] failed to regenerate towns” (Leunig, 
2008). Despite massive public expenditure in trying to promote development in the North, the 
results were dismal: the economic gap between a prosperous South of England and a 
declining North had continued to widen regardless of the efforts of successive governments 
(Martin et al., 2015). Development policies were not working and there was a need to rethink 
development strategies for lagging and declining areas in the UK, as the fate linked to 
geography could not be bucked (Leunig, 2008). 
The proposed solution was relatively simple: first, focus on the parts of the country that were 
prosperous and dynamic (i.e. London and the South East) and, second, allow “people in 
Liverpool, Sunderland, and so on” (Leunig, 2008) to move to the more affluent places in 
order to take advantage of the opportunities on offer there. This would imply massively 
expanding the housing stock around London – “making [London] a mile bigger would create 
400,000 new houses” (Leunig, 2008) – as well as multiplying the population of Oxford and, 
particularly, Cambridge by building there “as many as a million houses […] along the model 
of America's Silicon Valley” (Leunig, 2008). 
Although Leunig’s message was specifically targeted at the lack of economic dynamism in 
the North of England, it resonated in many parts of the world where past policies aimed at 
generating development, through an array of government agencies “such as the Economic 
Development Administration in the United States, the Department of Regional Economic 
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Expansion in Canada, the Department of Economic Affairs in Britain, the Delegation à 
l'Aménagement du Territoire in France, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in Italy” (Scott, 1992: 
220-221) had attempted “to create important new industrial growth centers through 
governmental action” with “very limited success” (Scott, 1992: 221). Traditional, supply-led 
development intervention was considered to have generally failed, leading to permanently 
assisted and sheltered economies (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2007; Fratesi and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2016). Places such as the Mezzogiorno in Italy (Viesti, 2001; González, 2011) or East 
Germany (Sinn, 2002) had, very much like the North of England, become increasingly 
dependent on transfers and welfare from the central or federal government. 
Leunig demonstrated considerable courage by standing in front of what would have been a 
polite but mostly hostile crowd. Moreover, according to Hilary Burrage’s (2008) account of 
the event at Liverpool Cathedral, Leunig was “quite obviously sincerely, very sorry about 
[the message he was conveying], and he didn't wish anyone to be upset”. However, what 
Leunig – as many other academics that preceded and have followed him – probably did not 
realise was that telling people that they and their children had no future if they stayed put 
would have been considered as being patronised by an aloof and distant elite. An elite that 
was telling them that the alternative was between facing slow decline – possibly attenuated 
by attempts at decentralising powers – or  leaving the places where most of them had been 
born and bred. An elite that, moreover, would suffer none of the costs and reap the potential 
benefits of any change in policy. Being told that where you live and where you belong does 
not matter is bound to make anyone react.  
And reacted they have. The reaction has, however, come from a somewhat unexpected 
source. In recent years the places that ‘don’t matter’ have increasingly used the ballot box 
(and, in some cases, outright revolt) to rebel against the feeling of being left behind; against 
the feeling of lacking opportunities and future prospects. Such reaction – which was already 
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evident in places like Thailand or some Latin American countries in the mid-2000s – pitches 
not so much the rich against the poor, as would have been envisaged by those focusing on 
interpersonal inequality (i.e. Piketty, 2014), but lagging and/or declining regions against more 
prosperous ones (Gordon, 2018). This political and territorial conflict, which has acquired 
greater notoriety since the 2016 Brexit vote in the UK, the 2016 election of Donald Trump in 
the USA, the 2016 Austrian presidential election, the 2017 French presidential, and the 2017 
German general elections, threatens to derail the very economic and social stability at the 
heart of the prosperity of the most dynamic cities and regions. Future economic growth and 
development at country level and in the most prosperous regions is being jeopardised by the 
revenge of the ‘places that don’t matter’. These places have risen and used the ballot box – 
often taking advantage of majoritarian electoral systems (Spicer, 2018) – to send the signal 
that if they are going down, as they have been repeatedly told, they are not going to go down 
without a fight. They may even be intent on sinking – or changing, depending on political 
views – the whole system with them. 
In this article for the special tenth anniversary issue of the Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society I will present a critical overview of the revenge of the ‘places that don’t 
matter’, asking why and how has it happened, why didn’t we see it coming despite many 
obvious signs, and what to do about it. In the process, I will establish links to the rest of the 
papers in the issue, as the majority of them raise very similar issues – albeit in a probably 
more systematic and less polemic and impassioned way. The article proceeds as follows. I 
will first examine the dominant narrative, compare the narrative to existing evidence and 
highlight why the most influential theories did not have the tools to foresee the reaction. I 
will then discuss what has been done wrong and how can the problem be addressed so as to 
ensure that opportunities for all are spread out and lagging-behind and declining territories 
fulfil their development potential. 
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The dominant narrative 
Tim Leunig’s message at Liverpool Cathedral may have been extreme, but perfectly reflects 
the dominant narrative emanating from urban economics and, to a lesser extent, new 
economic geography (NEG). This narrative puts forward the idea that big cities are the future 
and that the best form of territorial intervention is not to focus on declining places – 
perceived as having low potential – but to bet on what is supposed to be the winning horse: 
the largest and most dynamic agglomerations. 
Why focus on large cities? As Edward Glaeser (2011) makes clear in the subtitle of his 
seminal book Triumph of the City, cities are “our greatest invention” and make us “richer, 
smarter, greener, healthier, and happier”. This is achieved through a combination of factors 
which include agglomeration, density, and transport costs. Agglomeration and density 
facilitate the pooling of labour, the sharing and matching of infrastructure and suppliers, the 
interaction of economic agents, and, through learning processes, the generation, distribution 
and assimilation of knowledge and innovation (Duranton and Puga, 2004). Cities, being 
larger and denser than towns and rural areas, have a comparative advantage relative to any 
other places, meaning that firms benefit from being located in cities. But not any city will do: 
agglomeration economies increase with city size. According to urban economics, there are 
considerable advantages of being located in larger and denser cities, as “there are substantial 
productivity benefits for all firms in denser areas that are even stronger for more productive 
firms” (Combes et al., 2012: 2570). Firms in denser areas “are, on average, about 9.7 percent 
more productive than in less dense areas” (Combes et al., 2012: 2584). Improvements in 
accessibility and declines in transportation costs also help in this respect, as they contribute to 
channel physical and human capital and resources to the more dynamic cities, further 
enhancing density and agglomeration and, consequently, generating economic opportunity 
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and development. From this perspective promoting agglomeration and “urban density 
provides the clearest path from poverty to prosperity” (Glaeser, 2011: 1). 
This message has been enthusiastically picked up by policymakers over the last decade and 
increasingly drummed to inhabitants of lagging and/or declining areas as the way forward. As 
proclaimed by the World Economic Forum, “the 21st century will be the "century of the city" 
and “the ‘century of the city’ will be one marked by prosperity, inclusion, partnership, and 
sustainability” (World Economic Forum, 2012: 3).  
Focusing on cities and, especially, on the largest and most prosperous cities implies that 
“economic growth will be unbalanced” (Word Bank, 2009:  xxi), but “to try to spread it out is 
to discourage it—to fight prosperity, not poverty” (World Bank, 2009:  back cover). Hence, 
the main aim of policies should be to move people to places where there are opportunities, 
not opportunities to declining areas (World Bank, 2009: 241). “Subsidizing poor or 
unproductive places is an imperfect way of transferring resources to poor people” (Kline and 
Moretti, 2014: 656). In sum, this implies pursuing what has been called people-based policies 
at the expense of place-based policies, as place-based policies are, at best inefficient and, at 
worst, distortionary and slow the need for structural reform (cf. Partridge et al., 2015). 
 
Places that matter and places that don’t matter 
Is the 21
st 
century becoming, as advanced by the World Economic Forum, the century of the 
city and one marked by prosperity, inclusion, partnership, and sustainability? Or is it turning 
into one that increasingly divides places between those that matter and those that don’t 
matter?  
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At first sight, there is evidence that big cities in many parts of the world are doing 
swimmingly. Large cities like London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, or Singapore, have tended to 
perform relatively well, especially in the face of a protracted crisis and relative to the 
performance of other cities and regions in their respective countries and to other large 
metropoli in the world (Institute for Urban Strategies, 2017). Moreover, it seems that size 
matters more than ever. In a country like the United Kingdom, over the last four decades, the 
economic performance of London has exceeded that of Manchester and Birmingham, whose 
performance, in turn, has been better than that of Liverpool or Sheffield (Tyler et al., 2017). 
In France, Paris’ growth has outpaced that of Lyon, while Marseille and Lille have lagged 
further behind. Similarly, in Central and Eastern Europe the economic dynamism has been 
heavily concentrated in capital cities, which combine size with economic and political power. 
Urban economic studies looking at changes in economic performance have generally 
confirmed these trends. Bertinelli and Strobl (2007), Brülhart and Sbergami (2009), and 
Castells-Quintana and Royuela (2014) have underscored that the concentration of the 
population in the largest city leads to higher economic growth. According to this strand of 
research, productivity levels are also often enhanced by increases in city size. Doubling the 
size of a city can result in productivity increases that range between 3 and 8% (Rosenthal and 
Strange, 2004) and the yields can be higher in large cities in the developing world (Duranton, 
2015). 
Yet, the evidence that big cities are the main drivers of growth is far from consistent. There 
are plenty of once dominant cities that have suffered sharp or gradual economic declines. On 
top of the long decay of former industrial hubs such as Detroit, St Louis or Youngstown in 
the USA, Guyuan, Yichun or Lanzhou in China, or Dnipropetrovsk in the Ukraine, a number 
of formerly leading cities have seen their star fade especially relative to other, often initially 
smaller competitors. This has been the case of Montréal relative to Toronto in Canada or of 
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Kolkata relative to Mumbai in India. A similar, albeit less spectacular, change has been 
analysed by Storper et al. (2015) in the case of Los Angeles and San Francisco. Meanwhile 
many fast-growing cities in the developing world do not seem to have the capacity to act as 
motors of economic growth, especially the large “consumption cities” in Africa, whose 
growth has been mostly associated with wealth derived from resource exports (Gollin et al., 
2016). More systematic studies involving Europe (Dijkstra et al., 2013) or large samples if 
countries around the world (Frick and Rodríguez-Pose, 2016, 2018) have also challenged the 
urban economics view that large agglomerations are the main engines of growth. Factors like 
better quality of life, greater skills, and improvements in accessibility have propelled 
economic activity in many medium-sized and small cities, which in many countries have 
become an important source of economic dynamism.  
But if there is considerable discussion about the importance of big cities for economic 
development, what can be said about territorial polarisation? Is the 21st century leading to a 
more territorially inclusive society? Or has greater polarisation resulted in a division between 
places that matter and places that don’t matter? Here, the evidence is also controversial. In a 
recent study by Lessmann and Seidel (2017) covering virtually all countries in the world, 
they find that within-country territorial disparities have not increased as would have been 
expected if economic growth had been driven by a handful of large cities. About two thirds of 
all countries in the world have experienced a reduction of disparities between 1992 and 2012 
(Lessmann and Seidel, 2017). Most of this reduction has been concentrated in developed and 
middle-income countries. Territorial disparities have declined across the American continent 
(with the exception of Guyana), most of Europe, and in a number of Asian countries, such as 
China, the Philippines, or South Korea. Greater polarisation is, by contrast, in evidence in 
most of Africa, Eastern Europe, and large parts of South Asia (Lessmann and Seidel, 2017: 
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120). These are precisely some of the countries with the highest internal disparities and 
greater potential for conflict (Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). 
This evidence contradicts most predictions by urban economics and the idea put forward by 
the World Bank that economic development, at least in the initial stages, needs to be 
unbalanced (World Bank, 2009). Many less-developed regions across the world have actually 
caught up with richer regions in their respective countries. Whether this is the result of policy 
or of other factors would require greater investigation, but there seems to be a link between 
countries that have shown some concern for territorial inequality and have acted on it – 
generally better-off and emerging countries – relative to those that do not have the means or 
the will to intervene to promote economic development in their less developed regions.  
However, what is undeniable is that the economic dynamism of many areas in developed and 
developing countries has left a lot to be desired. Many poor regions have remained stuck for 
long periods in low income traps, while some formerly well-off and dynamic regions have 
experienced long periods of decay. This is often the case in many developing countries, a 
factor that is affecting the livelihoods and opportunities of its residents. As many poor 
countries around the world have abandoned traditional import-substitution strategies for 
economic openness, many core cities in these parts of the world have benefited, while the 
poorest of the poor have generally lost out (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2014: 179). This 
has been, for example, the case of Thailand, one of the countries with the highest level of 
territorial inequalities. Territorial conflict there has pitched a rich and relatively prosperous 
Bangkok against the highly impoverished rural areas in the Centre, North, and East. 
Likewise, in China the coastal provinces have prospered since the beginning of the 1990s, 
while many internal regions still lag massively behind. In India, many western and southern 
states, such as Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, or Tamil Nadu, have grown, while populous 
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northern and eastern states, such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, or West Bengal, have had far from 
glittering economic trajectories. 
Territorial imbalance-related problems are, however, not just confined to emerging countries 
with high levels of polarisation. In Europe, where territorial inequalities are, in general, much 
smaller, persistently low levels of regional growth in parts of the continent are at the root of 
an increasing economic and political instability. Figures 1 and 2 show the growth of GDP per 
head and employment change in the regions of the European Union (EU) between 1990 and 
2014. During this period economic growth has been mostly concentrated in some countries – 
Ireland, Estonia, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia – and in some dynamic cities – Bucharest, 
Budapest, Helsinki, Ljubljana, Madrid. The South of England, South Germany, Copenhagen, 
or Paris have also done relatively well over the long run. In contrast, low growth has been the 
norm in Bulgaria, eastern and southern areas of Hungary, most of East Germany, central 
Greece, southern Italy, the South of Portugal (with the exception of the Algarve) and in 
industrial declining regions of north-eastern France, north-western Italy, and the northern 
Czech Republic (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. GDP growth in the regions of the EU, 1990-2014 
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Figure 2. Employment change in the regions of the EU, 1990-2014 
 
The contrasts are even starker when looking at the differences in employment change. 
Employment declines over a period of 25 years have been the norm in the Baltic States, most 
of Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania (with the exceptions of the respective capitals), rural 
Hungary, western Poland, Portugal, and northern Finland and Sweden. Many old industrial 
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areas have been hit particularly hard, as is the case of Lorraine in France, most Czech regions 
outside Central Bohemia, Chemnitz and Saxony-Anhalt in Germany, or Birmingham in the 
UK (Figure 2).  
Similar trajectories can be spotted in many of the so-called ‘flyover’ and ‘rustbelt’ states in 
the US. The majority of the worst performing US metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) were 
located in the South. MSAs such as Dalton (GA), Hilton Head (SC), Naples (FL), or Myrtle 
Beach (SC-NC) had rates of average per capita GDP decline between 2001 and 2016 which 
exceeded 1.5 percent per annum. Many MSAs in so-called ‘flyover’ states performed only 
marginally better. Laredo (TX), El Paso (TX), Grand Junction (CO), Ann Arbor (MI), 
Lawrence (KS), Muncie (IN), Racine (WI), or Santa Fe (NM) all experienced annual GDP 
per capita declines in excess of 0.5 percent. Cases of similar economic decline along both 
coasts (outside Southern states) were few and far between – just Atlantic City (NJ) and Dover 
(DE).   
This geographical pattern is reproduced when only the 30 largest MSAs in the US are 
considered (Table 1). The worst performing largest cities in the US between 2001 and 2016 
are located in the South (Orlando, Atlanta, Charlotte, Miami, Tampa), in flyover regions 
(Phoenix, Sacramento, Riverside, Kansas City, Denver), or in rustbelt states (St. Louis, 
Detroit, Minneapolis) (Table 1). Of the 10 MSAs which had a GDP per capita growth of 1.0 
percent or more, eight are located along both coasts – Portland, Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Seattle, and New York (Table 1). Only Pittsburgh and San 
Antonio represented rustbelt or flyover states.  
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Table 1. Annual per capita real GDP growth between 2001 and 2016 in the 30 largest US 
MSAs in 2016.   
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
Population in 
2016 
Economic 
growth, 
2001-
2016 (%) 
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA  2,424,955 2.5 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA  13,310,447 1.8 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA  4,679,166 1.4 
Pittsburgh, PA  2,342,299 1.4 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH  4,794,447 1.3 
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD  2,798,886 1.3 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD  6,070,500 1.2 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  3,798,902 1.2 
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX  2,429,609 1.1 
New York-Newark-Bridgeport, NY-NJ-PA  20,153,634 1.0 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  7,233,323 0.9 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA  3,317,749 0.9 
Cleveland-Elyria, OH  2,055,612 0.9 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN  2,165,139 0.7 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI  9,512,999 0.6 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX  6,772,470 0.6 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV  6,131,977 0.6 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI  3,551,036 0.5 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  3,032,171 0.5 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO  2,853,077 0.5 
Kansas City, MO-KS  2,104,509 0.5 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL  6,066,387 0.4 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  4,527,837 0.4 
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC  2,474,314 0.4 
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI  4,297,617 0.4 
St. Louis, MO-IL  2,807,002 0.4 
Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade, CA  2,296,418 0.1 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  4,661,537 -0.1 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA  5,789,700 -0.2 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL  2,441,257 -0.2 
  Source: Own elaboration, using Bureau of Economic Analysis data   
Hence, a number of territories across the world are being left behind, experiencing long 
periods of decline. Whether it is Bihar in India, the central lowlands of Thailand, parts of East 
Germany, Champagne-Ardenne or Lorraine in France, or Michigan and Ohio in the USA, a 
‘geography of discontent’ (Los et al., 2017; Essletzbichler, 2018), often linked to crises in the 
agricultural and/or industrial sectors, to significant outward migration and brain drain, and, 
more importantly, to a feeling that there is no future and no hope, is emerging. The lack of 
faith in the future is giving way to the impression that these places matter less than hitherto. 
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And the belief that there are places that don’t matter comes both from within these declining 
areas – that feel left behind – and from the outside. Pejorative and widely used expressions 
such as ‘flyover country’ or ‘rustbelts’ do little to quell this perception, as “what arouses 
popular opposition is not inequality per se, but perceived unfairness” (Rodrik, 2017: 149). 
Overall, the fear of being left behind and of having no future is leading to a reaction which is 
starting to have serious political, social, and economic consequences. 
 
The revenge of the places that don’t matter 
Where is this reaction coming from? The reaction is coming from politics rather than 
economics. Populism as a political force has taken hold in many of these so-called spaces that 
don’t matter, in numbers that are creating a systemic risk – what Aoyama et al. (2018) and 
van Bergeijk (2018) call deglobalization (see also Gordon, 2018). Although the attention to 
the rise of populism has massively grown since the 2016 Brexit vote and the election of 
Donald Trump as president of the US, populism is nothing new. In recent decades, it has 
emerged as a political phenomenon in many parts of the world. But it is particularly in 
lagging-behind areas where it has taken hold. Populism has been a fact of daily political life 
in Latin America since at least the 1940s with the ascent of Juan Domingo Perón to 
Argentina’s presidency. In some cases, populist movements have derived into armed conflict, 
as was, for decades, the case in Colombia or Peru. In Nigeria or Indonesia, armed groups 
have found fertile grounds in lagging-behind areas. However, with the spread of democracy, 
populism has been transformed and become increasingly grounded on new types of anti-
party, ‘personalist’ movements. This is a type of populism which has thrived in areas 
particularly affected by poverty, prolonged economic crisis, and persistent social problems 
(Roberts, 1995). Such populism hinges, regardless of ideology, on the figure of a charismatic 
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leader: e.g. Alberto Fujimori, in Peru (Roberts, 1995), Hugo Chávez, in Venezuela (Hawkins, 
2003). This brand of populism has spread to other parts of Latin America, including Bolivia 
with Evo Morales, Ecuador with Rafael Correa, and Argentina with Néstor Kirchner and 
Cristina Fernández (De la Torre, 2013). The rest of the world has also not been immune to 
the phenomenon, as evidenced by Thailand (Hewison, 2014).  
In Thailand deeply ingrained territorial inequalities between a poor North and North-East, on 
the one hand, and Bangkok, on the other have driven the country to a political stalemate, 
pitching the red-shirts supporters of the populist, democratically-elected leader Thaksin 
Shinawatra, against the yellow-shirts royalists. The divide is a social and geographical one as 
the red-shirts are mainly rural workers from poor regions, whereas the yellow-shirts represent 
the urban elite and the Bangkok middle-classes. This division, which became entrenched 
since the 2006 military coup, has resulted in the politicization of territorial inequalities 
(Hewison, 2014) and in a deep-seated political conflict that has greatly affected economic 
activities in Thailand. Territorial inequalities have driven the process, as support for populism 
in Thailand “is concentrated in regions of relatively high poverty and low incomes” 
(Hewison, 2014: 859). 
It is, nevertheless, the recent rise to prominence of populism in the Western world which has 
caught the eye. From Belgium to Denmark, Austria to Canada, Hungary to Poland, France to 
Germany, and the UK to the USA, new brands of populism are on the rise (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2012; Greven, 2016). For many years populism in developed countries had 
remained a minority affair. The big turnaround took place in 2016 when populist movements 
made big breakthroughs in elections. First came the Brexit vote in the UK in June 2016, 
followed by the election of Donald Trump as president of the US in November 2016. 
Subsequent elections in Austria (Essletzbichler, 2018), the Netherlands, France, and Germany 
have somewhat halted the momentum, but have not diluted what seems to be a global drive 
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towards deglobalization (Aoyama et al., 2018), associated with an increasing reversal of 
global roles, with the US and the UK sliding into protectionism and China stepping in as the 
champion of a new form of globalization (Chen, 2018). 
As in developing countries, the rise of populism in the developed world is fuelled by political 
resentment (Cramer, 2016) and has a distinct geography. Populist votes have been heavily 
concentrated in territories that have suffered long-term declines and reflect an increasing 
urban/regional divide (McCann, 2016). In the UK’s Brexit vote, most big cities opted to 
remain in the EU (Essletzbichler 2018; Lee, 2018). This was the case of some of the most 
dynamic cities in the South East, including London, Brighton, Cambridge, and Oxford. Other 
cities in the rest of the country generally supported the remain camp. This applies to cities 
that according to Tyler et al. (2017) have performed well over the last four decades and a 
half, such as Aberdeen, Bristol, or Leeds, as well as to other whose economic performance 
has been well below par, such as Glasgow and Liverpool. However, not all large cities in the 
UK expressed a preference to remain. Birmingham, Hull, Sheffield, or Sunderland voted for 
Brexit. The Brexit vote was concentrated in many industrial declining and disadvantaged 
rural areas of the North and the East of England. Lincolnshire, the county with the highest 
share of the Brexit vote, has been among the areas with the lowest GDP growth over the last 
quarter of a century (Figure 1). By contrast, the most dynamic areas in recent years – London, 
the South and Scotland – are places that have become increasingly ‘decoupled’ from the UK 
economy and generally voted to remain (McCann, 2016). 
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election owes much to big swings in 
rustbelt states. Iowa, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin (together with Florida) flipped 
electoral votes between 2012 and 2016, de facto securing Trump the presidency. But even in 
these states the vote was territorially uneven. The big cities – Philadelphia, Detroit, 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus, Pittsburgh, and Des Moines – all supported Hillary 
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Clinton. This was also the case elsewhere in the US. Every city of more than 1 million 
inhabitants voted for the Democratic presidential candidate, as did most large university 
towns. Support for Clinton was also strongest on both coasts. Donald Trump’s victory was 
thus delivered by a combination of rustbelt and flyover country. 
France has been regarded by some as a key stage in the counterreaction against the rise of 
populism. However, the French two-round electoral systems masks that Marine Le Pen, a 
right-wing populist candidate, secured more than 21% of the vote in the first round and more 
than one third in the second. Geography once again emerges as the determinant of the vote 
distribution. In the first round of the election, most large French cities voted for candidates of 
the ‘establishment’. Paris, Lyon, Bordeaux, Nantes, Rennes, Strasbourg, or Reims all 
supported the current president, Emmanuel Macron. Nice voted for the right-wing candidate 
Fillon, while Marseille, Lille, Montpellier, Grenoble, and Toulouse gave the lead to Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon, who could be classified as a left-wing populist. In none of the French big cities 
did Marine Le Pen get the largest share of the votes. Toulon, with a population of less than 
165,000, was the largest city where Le Pen held the lead after the first round. Her support 
mainly emanated from the medium- and small-cities and rural areas of the French rustbelt in 
the North and North East of the country – in the regions of Champagne-Ardenne, Franche-
Comté, Lorraine Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and Picardie. Once again the old industrial regions 
which had experienced decades of deindustrialisation, job losses, and relative economic 
decline. But even in these regions, the main cities – Lille, Metz, Nancy, Amiens, and Reims – 
bucked the populist trend and supported Emmanuel Macron in both the first (with the 
exception of Lille) and second round of the election (see also Essletzbichler, 2018).  
In sum, the places that don’t matter are becoming tired of being told that they don’t matter 
and are exercising a subtle revenge. They are voting down or threatening to vote down a 
system they perceive has quelled their potential and driven them down a road in which the 
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future offers no opportunities, no jobs, and no hope (Gros, 2016; Rodrik, 2017). It is as if the 
declining agricultural areas and rustbelts the world over have had enough of being patronised 
and have said, rightly or wrongly, that enough is enough: if we are being told that we no 
longer matter and that we are going down, the whole ship will sink with us.   
 
Are we surprised? 
Have we been caught by surprise by the rise of populism? Although there will always be 
claims that a worldwide emergence of populism was on the cards, the reality is that, by and 
large, the political world and mainstream academia have been caught completely unaware 
and unprepared not just by the surge of populism, but mainly by its ascent to power and by 
the challenges it poses. In the political world virtually no one – not even its promoters – 
believed that Britain would vote for Brexit until the scrutiny started and the first results came 
through. The same could be said for Donald Trump’s victory. Until the day of the election, it 
seemed that Hillary Clinton would emerge as the clear winner. 
Even more excruciating has been the total unpreparedness of most mainstream academia (see 
also Spicer, 2018 in this issue). The challenge has come from an obvious, but at the same 
time completely unexpected source: the ballot box. How was this missed? There are basically 
four reasons that could have clouded our judgement and explain why the ascent of populism 
has remained under the radar. With notable exceptions, mainstream academia has been a) 
looking at the wrong types of negative externalities; b) ignoring one important form of 
inequality; c) overestimating the capacity and willingness of individuals to move; and d) 
overlooking or dismissing the economic potential of many lagging-behind areas. 
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The wrong type of negative externalities: New economic geography and urban economics 
have been for long conscious that agglomeration, for all its advantages, can trigger a number 
of negative externalities. High land rents, congestion, and pollution have traditionally been 
considered as the main negative externalities. An excessive concentration of economic actors 
and activity in large cities increases land rents and raises congestion and pollution in ways 
that can undermine some of the benefits linked to agglomeration. However, according to 
these theories, the costs of agglomeration are still clearly outweighed by its benefits. 
While high land rents, congestion, and pollution can certainly be significant negative 
externalities, the real cost so far has not come from them, but from an entirely unexpected 
source: social and economic, real or perceived distress in many non-agglomerated areas. The 
areas left behind, those having witnessed long-periods of decline, migration and brain drain, 
those that have seen better times and remember them with nostalgia, those that have been 
repeatedly told that the future lays elsewhere, have used the ballot box as their weapon. Their 
aim may simply have been a call for greater attention and opportunities. It may just represent 
a revolt vote or even a warning sign of a need to review the system. But the economic 
consequences are plain to see. Thailand’s conflict between Bangkok and its central, northern, 
and eastern regions has been simmering for long, affecting economic activity and curtailing 
overall national growth. Brexit may mean that the areas that voted for parting with the EU – 
which are, paradoxically, some of the most dependent on EU trade and support (Los et al., 
2017) – may end up being worse off in the future as, if we are to believe most pre- and post-
Brexit vote predictions (Dinghra et al., 2016; Los et al., 2017), will be the case for the whole 
country. 
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Considering territorial inequality as almost irrelevant: The worries about inequality before 
the outbreak of populism were all about interpersonal inequality (e.g. Sassen, 2001; Piketty, 
2014). The globalised system dominant since the 1970s had concentrated wealth in an ever 
smaller share of individuals at the top of the pyramid, leading to a growing economic 
polarisation of society. Nowhere was this polarisation more evident than in big cities, where 
globalisation had both engendered an economic elite in sectors such as finance, insurance, or 
technology, together with an impoverished underclass whose task was and is to service the 
elite (Sassen, 2001). If there was going to be a challenge to the system, it surely had to come 
from rising interpersonal inequalities in cities (Gordon, 2018). The poor could revolt any 
time: “Inequality in the ownership of capital brings the rich and poor within each country into 
conflict with one  another  far  more  than  it  pits  one  country  against  another” (Piketty, 
2014: 56). And this view is so ingrained that post-Brexit and post-Trump accounts about the 
rise of populism (e.g. Rodrik, 2017) are still all about interpersonal inequality (see also 
Gordon, 2018, for a criticism of this point). Territorial inequality was mostly dismissed as 
ancillary or even irrelevant. As a consequence, intervening in low-income, low-density places 
was regarded, at best, as a second-best solution to targeting interpersonal inequality (Kline 
and Moretti, 2014: 656) and, at worst, as inefficient and leading to little discernible impact 
(Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). 
Yet, in the Brexit vote and in the elections of Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron there is 
little evidence that interpersonal inequality played a decisive role. The poorest of the poor in 
the ghettoes and impoverished boroughs of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, San 
Francisco, or Los Angeles, to name a few, voted alongside the very rich for Hillary Clinton 
rather than for Donald Trump. Likewise, the inhabitants of the HLMs (Habitations à loyer 
modéré or public housing) in the suburbs of northern and northeastern Paris did not vote for 
Marine Le Pen. They voted together with the very wealthy of the 5
th
 and 6
th
 districts of the 
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city. Similarly, in London, Tower Hamlets, Newham, or Bermondsey – among the poorest 
boroughs in the UK – voted with Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea against Brexit. 
Populism took hold not among the poorest of the poor, but in a combination of poor regions 
and areas that had suffered long periods of decline. It has been thus the places that don’t 
matter, not the ‘people that don’t matter’, that have reacted. In these areas it has been very 
often the relatively well-off, those in well-paid jobs or with pensions that heeded the call of 
populism. Trump supporters in Ohio, Pennsylvania, or Michigan are generally better off than 
Clinton supporters. 
This is not to say that interpersonal inequality does not matter, but that the challenge to the 
system has come from a neglected source of inequality: territorial and not interpersonal, as 
was generally expected. As indicated by Gordon (2018), policies do not only operate in a 
spaceless individual world, but in one where political and economic geographies are driven 
by strong, place-based effects. 
 
Overestimating the capacity and willingness of individuals to move: When Tim Leunig 
encouraged patrons at Liverpool Cathedral to migrate to the South East of England, he was 
merely expressing the widely held assumption in urban economics that mobility is costless or 
that, at least, it is preferable to move to where the opportunities are than to stay put in a place 
where the chances of finding a job or making a career are limited. Urban economics and other 
economic theories tend to emphasise the role – and, to a certain extent, the ease – of 
individual mobility (Kline and Moretti, 2014). Perfect, or almost perfect, labour mobility 
represents a general assumption in urban economics models. If there is a real barrier to 
mobility – and possibly the main cause to implement place-based policies from this 
perspective – it is “inelastic housing supply in the targeted area” (Neumark and Simpson, 
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2014: 6; cf. Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). The solution is, therefore, obvious: build more 
housing in the places of destination by making more land available and relaxing planning 
regulations. However, facilitating access to housing in dynamic areas is unlikely to address 
the problems of lack of mobility from lagging and/or declining areas. Brexit areas in the UK 
are the realm of the ‘immobile’ (Lee, 2018) and more affordable housing in London is not 
going to suddenly make all people from Boston (Lincolnshire) more employable and move in 
search of greater opportunities. Those in Boston that could move have probably already done 
so. Those that remain are unlikely to relocate for a variety of reasons. These include, among 
others, emotional attachment to the place where they live, age, and lack of sufficient skills 
and qualifications. Older and retired citizens are much less likely to migrate. Those with 
limited or conventional skills will be unable to compete at the top end of the London market 
with the pool of workers with higher skills and, at the bottom end, with those, often coming 
from abroad and in irregular situations, willing to accept lower wages. Transfer payments 
from the government, stagnant or declining house prices in shrinking cities and lagging-
behind regions (Partridge et al., 2015: 1312), as well legal barriers in certain parts of the 
world – e.g. the hukou system in China – further restrict the mobility of individuals from 
lagging and/or declining regions to core areas. No improvements in housing accessibility are 
therefore likely to make the immobile class (Lee, 2018) suddenly mobile. The assumption of 
perfect mobility is, hence, less than perfect. 
 
Overlooking the economic potential of lagging-behind and declining areas: As Tim Leunig 
explained in Liverpool, the overwhelming belief in academia has been that many lagging-
behind and declining areas have seen better times and that those times are unlikely to return. 
Investing in these areas involves, according to most urban economics literature, “potentially 
severe equity-efficiency trade-offs” (Kline and Moretti, 2014: 656). From this perspective 
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“subsidizing poor or unproductive places is an imperfect way of transferring resources to 
poor people” (Kline and Moretti, 2014: 656). Hence the solution involves limiting the 
investment in sparsely populated lagging areas – while providing basic services – and 
encouraging mobility towards core areas in more densely populated, but declining or poor 
regions (World Bank, 2009: 242). However, shifting the attention from the so-called places 
that don’t matter towards more dynamic cities and regions risks leaving local potential 
untapped (Barca et al., 2012: 147). This is can be damaging on two counts.  
First, not all lagging-behind and declining areas have no economic potential. Many once 
lagging behind areas are now leading regions, while former leaders have, at times, become 
economic backwaters. The Asian Dragons were underdeveloped until a few decades ago; 
Flanders, in Belgium, lagged behind Wallonia; the now world-leading South of Germany was 
once a quiet agricultural region; while Las Vegas arose from the desert. By contrast, there is 
no shortage of once prosperous cities in North America and in Europe whose recent 
economic trajectories have been subpar. From Detroit to Buffalo or from Chaleroi to 
Katowice agglomerations that were leaders in a series of industrial sectors have suffered 
extensive economic degeneration in recent decades. As indicated by Barca et al. (2012: 149), 
“tapping into unused potential in intermediate and lagging areas is not only not detrimental 
for aggregate growth, but can actually enhance both growth at a local and a national level” 
Second, shifting away attention from places in need of support to more prosperous and 
dynamic ones causes distress and resentment in the neglected spaces, especially as the lack of 
capacity and/of opportunities for mobility implies that a considerable part of the local 
population is effectively stuck in areas considered to have no future. Hence, the seed for 
revenge is planted. 
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Has nothing been done for declining areas? 
Why are the places that don’t matter rebelling? Has nothing been done for them? As Leunig 
defended in Liverpool Cathedral, it is not that nothing has been done in declining and lagging 
behind areas. Many different strategies have been tried to promote development and growth, 
but the results have been, at best, mixed. 
National and supra-national level intervention has typically taken two forms. On the one 
hand, traditional top-down development strategies, often based on the promotion of growth 
poles or similar territorial development strategies, have been a constant in many lagging or 
falling/behind areas. Their aim has been to promote growth in less developed and declining 
territories, while, at the same time, reduce regional disparities. The result of these 
development strategies has, according to Leunig and most urban economists, been well below 
expectations. Promoting what are often large scale projects in areas with vulnerable or 
weakened socio-economic conditions does not always end up in success. The list of ‘white 
elephants’ (Albalate and Bel, 2011) or ‘cathedrals in the desert’ (Lipietz, 1980) in poor and/or 
declining areas is large. Poor local institutions and government quality in many of these areas 
frequently lead to the design and implementation of ‘glitzy’, but often superfluous, 
development strategies. Such strategies often promote the individual interests of specific 
political and/or economic stakeholders, and end up burning large amounts of scarce financial 
resources with little to show in terms of sustainable employment creation or economic growth 
(Flyvbjerg, 2009; Crescenzi et al., 2016).    
On the other hand and especially in developed countries, governments have tended to resort 
to inter-regional transfers and the welfare state in order to mitigate the symptoms of 
economic backwardness or decline and to support the population in lagging-behind and 
declining regions. Across Europe welfare policies are not only socially, but also territorially 
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progressive. Regions in distress generally receive more support per capita than more 
prosperous ones. Governments also use public employment as a means to soften the blow of 
rapid employment decline in many areas lagging behind. Figure 3 displays the distribution of 
public sector employment in 2016 across regions classified according to their level of GDP 
per capita in six different European countries. The relationship is always the same. Whether 
in France, Germany, Greece, or Poland, public employment is, on average, higher in poorer 
than in richer regions. This reflects a conscious effort by governments to substitute 
increasingly rare and dwindling jobs in the private sector by public employment as a way to 
improve the livelihoods of individuals and to pump resources into precarious local 
economies. 
The same could be said for public transfers (Figure 4). Negative slopes in the relationship 
between net fiscal balances by states or regions, when classified according to their level of 
development per capita, signal a territorially progressive fiscal system using public funds 
aimed at maintaining welfare in the worst-off areas. This is the case in Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the USA (Figure 4), but applies as well to most developed economies. 
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Figure 3. Public employment in 2016 relative to regional GDP per capita 
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Figure 4. Net fiscal balance relative to regional wealth, 2016 
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Unfortunately, both investment-based and welfare- and support-based policies have not 
always achieved the desired results. A combination of misguided investments – frequently 
pursuing individual interests at the expense of collective ones (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013) –,  
income-support transfers, and public employment has often resulted in protected, assisted, 
and sheltered economies, increasingly incapable of mobilising their true economic potential 
(Fratesi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2016). These territories become more and more reliant on 
transfers – from the state in the case of the poorest and/or declining regions in developed 
countries and from international organisations in many developing countries. As Bevilacqua 
(2005: 171) has noted in the case of Italy, policies “targeting the support of economic 
structures [… ] have increasingly become an instrument for assistance, income support, the 
maintenance and nurturing of clientelistic networks, and for connivance between political 
power and active groups in civil society”.   
When this modus operandi becomes deeply-rooted in a territory, the sense that there is no 
future takes hold making permanent assistance even more necessary. Local inhabitants are 
generally aware of this and are far from satisfied with the situation. They want opportunities 
rather than assistance and aid; they want a future rather than permanent support. It is in these 
circumstances when they feel at their most vulnerable and talk of focusing scarce resources in 
dynamic and prosperous places in what they believe is at their expense is massively resented. 
 
Towards a different type of policy 
If traditional policies have failed and the places that don’t matter are rebelling and threatening 
not only their own future, but also the viability and economic prosperity of the most dynamic 
places, what is the solution to the problem? On the one hand, given the reaction that we are 
witnessing in places like Thailand, the UK, or the US, the solution cannot be more policy for 
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prosperous areas and less for poor and/or declining ones. Territorial inequality, persistent lack 
of opportunities, and incapacity and/or unwillingness to move are at the root of a resentment 
that is lightning the fire of territorially-based populism. Withdrawing intervention in these 
areas will inevitably add fuel to the fire. On the other, promoting more of the same policies, 
as posited by territorial development enthusiasts, is also not a solution. If many of the 
development strategies applied in recent years have not worked and, in the worst case 
scenario, have benefitted clientelistic networks and stimulated the creation of assisted 
economies, the solution cannot be more of the same. 
The answer has to come not from less or more intervention, but from a different type of 
intervention. One that moves away from simply providing welfare, away from continuing to 
shelter the inhabitants of less developed and declining areas, and away from supply-led 
interventions that end up becoming white elephants. The solution needs to be place-sensitive, 
that is policies that are informed by theory and empirical evidence but that, at the same time, 
respond to the structural opportunities, potential, and constraints of each place (Iammarino et 
al., 2017). The advantage of these policies is that they can overcome the false trade-off 
between efficiency and equity. When there are barriers to mobility and when there are 
significant constraints for economic activity to spread from core to less developed areas, 
focusing on the most prosperous regions is not equity enhancing. It may also not be 
efficiency enhancing as “it is not clear that economic agglomeration will always lead to 
sustained high annual average growth and, even if it were the case, that growth, prosperity, 
and welfare would subsequently spread out from agglomerations to less prosperous 
peripheries” (Tomaney et al., 2010: 775; cf. McCann, 2016). Strategies focusing on large 
agglomerations always imply that considerable aggregate economic development potential 
remains untapped.  
32 
 
The only way to overcome this false dilemma is by tapping “into untapped potential in all 
regions in a co-ordinated and systematic way” (McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011: 211). 
This requires policies aimed not a providing transfers or welfare, but at enhancing the 
opportunities of most territories, regardless of their level of development or economic 
trajectory and taking into account local context. In this scenario tackling institutional 
inefficiencies and bottlenecks head on and emphasising portable skills through measures 
aimed at boosting training, promoting entrepreneurship, and facilitating the assimilation of 
knowledge and innovation, becomes a must.  
One of the main challenges for the implementation of this type of place-sensitive policies in 
lagging-behind and/or declining areas is institutional. Elite capture of rents has often derailed 
past intervention. Turning a blind eye on corruption, clientelism, nepotism, free-riding, and 
rent-seeking can only increase the widespread perception that any intervention is aimed at 
benefitting the ruling elites, putting further wind in the sails of populism. 
 
Conclusion 
Years of decline, lack of opportunities, and perceived neglect have put lagging-behind and 
declining areas in a state of flux. Being told that their future is bleak, as traditional 
development policies have had limited returns and that, as a consequence, it would be best to 
invest in more prosperous places has done little to quell the unrest. In fact, the places that 
don’t matter are surfing the wave of populism and, through the ballot box or revolt, attacking 
the very factors on which recent economic growth has been based: open markets, migration, 
economic integration, and globalisation (Aoyama et al., 2018). 
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The populist revolt is being erected along territorial cleavages and will affect, first and 
foremost, the very areas that are pushing it forward (e.g. Los et al., 2017). More populism is 
likely to mean less economic stability and more inefficient governments and policies. This 
could translate into lower taxation receipts and less inward investment, affecting primarily 
regions that depend more on welfare and transfers as well as on jobs for the medium- and 
low-skilled. But populism and its ascent to power are also shaking the foundations of a 
system that has, to a certain extent, relied on a number of dynamic agglomerations as the 
main source of economic growth. Brexit will affect London’s growth prospects in a similar 
way as it will be detrimental to the economic perspectives of the North and North East of 
England, while Trump’s presidency will have implications for the prosperity of America that 
go well beyond the flyover and rustbelt states where Trump’s power base lays. 
The rapid rise of populism represents a serious and real challenge to the current economic 
and political systems. The stakes are exceptionally high and there is no time for business as 
usual. The array of solutions is, however, limited. Doing nothing is not an option, as the 
territorial inequalities at the root of the problem are likely to continue increasing, further 
stirring social, political, and economic tensions. Encouraging migration, as proposed by Tim 
Leunig in Liverpool and supported by urban economics, may only be feasible for those with 
high skills and already living in developed countries. The costs of migrating for the low- and 
intermediate-skilled remain high – especially the opportunity costs of migration in developed 
countries – and within-country migration has dropped considerably since the beginning of the 
crisis. Betting on big cities is also risky. Urbanisation without growth is becoming 
increasingly the norm (Jedwab and Vollrath, 2015). The image of big cities as engines of 
growth is also being dismissed by some as a 1990s story (Dijkstra et al., 2013). There is no 
law that makes big cities always more dynamic. Gambling on large agglomerations as 
winning horses is not always a sure bet and is now becoming more perilous than ever. And 
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even if large cities were always more dynamic, concentrating on big cities would lead to a 
rise in territorial inequality which will further ignite populism. Decentralising and devolving 
power to less developed cities and regions has also resulted in disappointing economic 
outcomes in recent times (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010), while sticking to social and 
welfare policies can result in permanently dependent populations and territories, possibly 
stunting economic growth and leading to a rise in social and political tensions. 
Development policies for lagging and declining areas offer the most realistic and viable 
option. This does not mean more policies, but better policies. Policies aimed at maximising 
the development potential of each territory, solidly grounded in theory and evidence, 
combining people-based with place-based approaches, and empowering local stakeholders to 
take greater control of their future (Iammarino et al., 2017). There is no complete guarantee 
that this type of policies will stem all the risks, but they do provide the best options to 
enhance the opportunities of individuals and workers to thrive and prosper, regardless of 
where they live. Not trying will only make things worse, bypass economic development 
opportunities, and lead to a world in which the revenge of the places that don’t matter will be 
fully justified as continued economic, social, and territorial conflict continues to erode the 
economic, social, and political foundations on which current and future well-being is based. 
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